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The process of cryopreservation of embryos is a relatively new concept in the field of in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) treatment. South African law is silent on the manner in which these 
cryopreserved embryos should be disposed of; in instances of divorce. 
During the course of this paper, comparisons will be made between South Africa and 
countries that have already dealt with custody disputes of these cryopreserved embryos 
during divorce. The United States of America (USA); Unoted Kingdom (UK) and Australia 
are countries that have already dealt with these issues in their courts. The analogies made 
between these countries and South Africa will illustrate the deficiencies in South African law.  
The USA, UK and Australia will also be compared with each other to demonstrate which 
country has the most accurate approach in dealing with these matters.  To this end, cases that 
have been dealt with in each of the countries’ jurisdictions will be examined and critiqued.   
The validity of surrogacy agreeements, both under the common law and under the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005 (The Children’s Act), will also be discussed.  The purpose of this discussion 
is to comment on the similarities between surrogacy agreements, and embryo disposition 
agreements, and argue that laws similar (to those regulating surrogacy agreements) should be 
promulgated to govern and regulate embryo disposition agreements. 
The submission that I will make in conclusion is that in the event of not enacting legislation 
to specifically govern embryo disposition agreements, the legislature should amend the 
Children’s Act to include the regulation of embryo disposition agreements.  The amendment 
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1.1. Overview of the topic 
This paper will begin by explaining and dealing with definitions and basic principles related 
to the content that will serve as the focal point throughout this discussion.   
The South African perspective on the issue of conferring legal status upon cyropreserved 
embryos,1 will be analysed.  In this chapter the tools that will be discussed to determine and 
depict the degree of protection afforded to cryopreserved embryos under South African law 
are: the Constitution;2 the Human Tissue Act;3  National Health Act;4 its Regulations;5 and a 
number of cases.   
This research paper will focus on foreign jurisdictions that have already dealt with the issue 
of affording legal status  to cryopreserved embryos for the purpose of determining custody 
during divorce proceedings.  The jurisdictions that will be dealt with in this regard are the 
United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia.  These 
jurisdictions will be compared to each other to determine which of these countries has taken 
the most appropriate approach in dealing with the disposition of cryopreserved embryos.  
After deciding which jurisdiction has the most appropriate approach, an analysis and 
comparison will be made to remedy the lacunae6 that exist in South Africa.   
The next segment of the discussion will focus on surrogacy agreements and their validity in 
terms of the law.  Surrogacy agreements7 will be compared to embryo disposition 
                                                          
1 National Health Act 61 of 2003, Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons in GN 869 in GG 
26595 of 23rd July 2004 - describes freezing or cryopreservation as – ‘freezing or cryopreserving genetic 
material including ova, sperm, embryos or ovarian tissue by an authorized institution’ - section 1. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
3 The Human Tissue Act 64 of 1983. 
4 The National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
5 The Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
6 ‘A lacuna is an empty space in the law with no regulations applicable or an absent part in a law.  It denotes an 
instance where there is no controlling law,’ available at: 
http://www.translegal.com/legal-latin/lacuna, accessed 24th November 2014. 
7 The Children’s Act (note 14 above) Section 293 – the surrogacy agreement must be entered into, in writing, 





agreements.  Embryo disposition agreements are agreements that exist between the donating 
couple and the institution in which the embryos will be cryogenically frozen and stored.8  
These agreements regulate how embryos are to be disposed of in the instance of divorce.9  
The rationale for making the comparision between embryo disposition agreements and 
surrogacy agreements is to illustrate the similarities between these these two types of 
agreements.  The issue of whether or not embryo disposition agreements are contra bonos 
mores10 and whether or not they should be given preference over the interests of  the parties 
will be discussed.11  It will be submitted that since surrogacy agreements are accepted and 
recognised by the South African legal system (having legislation that governs it), then the 
same acceptance and recognition should be extended to embryo disposition agreements.     
In the absence of legislation to govern this lacuna in South Africa regarding the legal status 
of cryopreserved embryos,   
the submissions made will include that: 
(a) Similar to the United Kingdom12 and Australia,13 South Africa set up a committee to 
make recommendations to the Legislature to draft legislation that will govern embryo 
disposition agreements; alternatively   
(b) the Children’s Act14 should be amended to regulate embryo disposition agreements, 
similarlt to how surrogacy agreements15 are presently governed. 
                                                          
8 JA Robertson ‘Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos’ Ohio State LJ (1990) 51 407, 410 – 
embryo disposition agreements are agreements that are entered into and exist between the couple and the 
program/institution for disposition and set out exactly how these cryopreserved embryos that are kept in a 
storage facility at the program/institution treatment facility, will be disposed in the instance of an arising 
dispute.  These agreements are said to be legally binding.  
9 Ibid. 
10 ‘Against good morals, available at: 
http://leagl-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/_/dict.aspx?rd=1&word=contra=bonos=mores, accessed 21st 
May 2014. 
11 This depends on the facts of the case and refers to the instance where the court (or other institution; or person) 
must deliberate and give weight to considerations of both parties to the dispute.  After doing this the court must 
make a decision about who they believe is in the best position to have the benefit (in question) accrued to them. 
12 Report of the Warnock Committee Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984. 
13New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report 58 Artificial Conception: In Vitro Fertilization 1988. 
14 The Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
15 Ibid Section 292. 
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1.2. Background to the topic 
There are many couples in South Africa, as well as internationally, who struggle to conceive 
a child naturally.  This may be due to either the male or female being infertile, or either the 
male or female having a genetic disease or disability that they may pass on to a child should 
the child be conceived naturally.  The prospective parent or parents may be a same sex couple 
who would like to become parents without resorting to adoption.16 
 
It is for these reasons that numerous advancements have been made in the field of 
reproductive technology and embryology to provide people and in particular, couples, with 
the opportunity to become parents where natural conception is not an option. The most 
common of these artificial fertilisation procedures,17 is in vitro fertilisation (IVF).18  
 
 
1.3. The IVF Procedure 
The process of IVF involves extracting the oocyte19 and then merging it with the sperm20 
outside the human body.21 
                                                          
16 J and Another v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 605 (D). 
17 The Children’s Act (note 14 above) defines artificial fertilisation as ‘the introduction of means, other than 
natural means, of a male gamete, into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for the purpose of 
human reproduction, including:  
(a) the bringing together of a male and female gamete outside the human body with a view to placing the 
product of a union of such gametes in the womb of a female; or  
(b) the placing of the product of a union of a male and female gametes which have been brought together 
outside the human body, in the womb of a female person’ - Section 1. 
The Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above) - defines artificial fertilisation as 
the introduction by other than natural means of a male gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs 
of a female person for the purpose of human reproduction and includes artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilisation, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, embryo intrafallopian transfer or intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection, Regulation 1. 
17 Human Embryo Cryopreservation, available at:  
http://www.ivf.com?cryo.html, accessed 23rd March 2014. 
19 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above) - the female gamete. 
20 Ibid - the male gamete. 
21 The Children’s Act (note 14 above). 
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The mature oocytes22 (which will be harvested) are surgically retrieved through one of two 
ways.23  The first, most popular method, is retrieval of the oocytes through ultrasound-guided 
transvaginal aspiration.  The process involves a vaginal ultrasound where a probe is inserted 
into the vaginal cavity24 that sends an ultrasound image to a monitor which guides the 
physician to the ovary containing the oocytes.25  A hollow needle is then directed through the 
vaginal wall into the ovary and the oocytes are removed via aspiration (suction).26  
 
The second method of egg retrieval is through laparoscopic surgery.  This process involves a 
form of surgery that is slightly more invasive using a laparoscope or camera placed through a 
small incision in the abdominal wall (usually through the umbilicus).  This allows the 
surgeon to view and scan the internal organs.27   
Upon retrieval, the oocytes are fertilised with sperm in a petri dish28 to create an embryo.29  
Some of the embryos are implanted into the uterus for procreation, while the others are 
cryogenically preserved30 for future implantation.31  The IVF laboratory usually fertilises 
more eggs than can be implanted safely on an attempt to prevent the intrusive process of egg 





                                                          
22 About the In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) Process, available at: 
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.org/ivf/process, accessed 4th December 2014. 
23 LS Langley and J.W Blackston ‘Sperm, Egg, and a Petri Dish: Unveiling the underlying property issues 
surrounding Cryopreserved Embryos’ The J of Legal Medicine (2006) 27 167, 174. 
24 In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) Process (note 22 above). 
25 Langley and Blackston (note 23 above) 173. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 A ‘petri dish’ is a shallow circular flat-bottomed dish, often with a fitting cover, used in laboratories, 
especially for producing cultures of microorganisms, available at: 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/petri+dish, accessed 24th November 2014. 
29 Human Embryo Cryopreservation (note 17 above). 
30 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
31 Human Embryo Cryopreservation (note 17 above). 




Embryo cryopreservation has become standard practice in IVF programs because of the 
ability of the process to enhance both the safety and efficiency of the IVF procedure.  The 
embryos that have not been implanted are frozen in liquid nitrogen, allowing the embryos to 
be safely preserved in a suspended biological state.33  Once frozen, the embryos are stored in 
special containers34 until they are ready for implantation35 for the purpose of procreation.36 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
Controversy arises when couples who have engaged in IVF treatement initiate divorce 
proceedings, and the custody and disposition of the cryopreserved embryos are in dispute.37  
The reason for the dispute is because each parent seeks control over the cryopreserved 
embryos38 that are kept in storage facilities at fertility clinics, with one parent wanting to 
dispose of these embryos and avoid forced parenthood and the other parent wanting to have 
them implanted as at a later stage.39  This concept of forced parenthood will be discussed 
later and in more detail. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the South African perspective and what has been done 
regarding the legal status of a cryopreserved embryo, and the approach adopted when dealing 









36 Human Embryo Cryopreservation (note 17 above). 
37 H Forster ‘The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human 
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposition in Britain and the lack of Law in the United States’ Washington 
University LQ (1998) 76 759, 769; A. M Johnson, Jr ‘The Legality of Contracts Governing the Disposition of 
Embryos: Unenforceable Intra-Family Agreements’ Southwestern LR (2013) 43 191,197. 
38 Kass v Kass (1998) 696 NE 2d 174 NY. 
39 Ibid 178. 
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2. The South African Perspective on the status of Cryopreserved Embryos 
 
The definitions and basic principles that are used throughout this paper have already been 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
This chapter will deal with the approach that South Africa has adopted regarding the legal 
status of cryopreserved embryos.  The Constitution,40 Human Tissue Act,41 National Health 
Act42 and its Regulations,43 and case law will be discussed. 
 
 
2.1. The difference between an embryo and a foetus 
In medicine there is a difference between an embryo and a foetus, depending on their 
developmental stage after conception.44  The difference is that conceptions are referred to as 
embryos from the day after conception, until the eighth week of the preganancy.  From the 
eighth week until the before the birth, it is referred to as a foetus.45  This definition does not 
sit in law.46 
 
 
2.2. South Africas’ position regarding the granting of conferring a legal status on 
embryos 
 
2.2.1. The Constitution 
The Constitution47 provides an array of rights that are available to people in South Africa. 
There are no provisions in the Constitution48 which refer specifically to foetuses or 
embryos.49  Sections 12(2) (a) and 27 (1) (a), however, refer to reproductive rights.50 
                                                          
40 1996 Constitution (note 2 above). 
41 The Human Tissue Act (note 3 above). 
42 The National Health Act (note 4 above). 
43 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
44 http://www.invitra.com/difference-between-a-zygote-an-embryo-and-a-fetus/, accessed 20 July 2014. 
45 Ibid. 
46 S v Collop 1979 (4) SA 381 (C). 




Section 12(2) (a)51 states that ‘everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, 
including the right to make decisions concerning reproduction’.   
Section 27(1) (a)52 states that ‘everyone has the right of access to health care services 
including reproductive health care’.   
 
It can be adduced that these rights set out in the Constitution,53 are rights that may be invoked 
by a woman when choosing whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, or to take 
contraceptives as it is her body.  
 
It is submitted that foetuses and embryos are mentioned, indirectly, as they are linked to 
reproduction.  Unfortunately, our Constitution,54 unlike the German Constitution55  does not 
make provision for or recognise the legal status of embryos or foetuses.  This was reaffirmed 
by the Christian Lawyers case.56  In this case the court confirmed that there are no provisions 
in the Constitution that afford protection to a foetus unless such a foetus is born alive.57  The 
court stated, further, that the drafters of the Constitution would have expressly stated that they 
wished to afford protection and a status to the foetus if this was their intention.58 
 
 
The German Constitution Court states that embryos should be considered ‘human life’ and 
not just ‘potential human life’ and as such, are entitled to the rights under the German 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
49 Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T), 1121. 
50 Ibid. 
51 1996 Constitution (note 2 above). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 1996 Constitution (note 2 above). 
55 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (The German Constitution) states that ‘every person 
shall have the right to life and physical integrity’ - Article 2 (2). 
56 Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others (note 49 above). 
57 Ibid 1121. 
58 Ibid 1122. 
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Constitution,59 as the embryo is recognised as being independent of its mother.60  However, 




Legislaton in South Africa is equally silent on the matter of cryopreserved embryos and the 
status which they are given.  South African legislation makes no provision for the status of 
either cryopreserved embryos or foetuses. 
Prior to the Human Tissues Act,63 there was no legislation regulating artificial fertilisation in 
South Africa.64  On 1 March 2012 the Human Tissues Act65 was repealed and replaced by 
Chapter 8 of the National Health Act.66  Regulations67 regarding artificial fertilisation in 
terms of the National Health Act were promulgated on 2 March 2012.68 
  
The Human Tissue Act69 did not include a definition for embryos or foetuses but included a 
definition for gametes. A gamete, according to the definitions section of the Human Tissue 
Act,70 means ‘either of the two generative cells that are essential for human reproduction’.71 
 
The National Health Act,72 unlike the Human Tissue Act73 defines the embryo as ‘a human 
offspring in the first eight weeks from conception’.74  The National Health Act75 mentions 
                                                          
59 M Coester ‘The Protection of the Embryo under German Family Law’ J of Child Law (1993) 5(2) 88, 89. 
60 Ibid 92. 
61 The German Constitution (note 49 above). 
62 Coester (note 59 above) 92. 
63 The Human Tissue Act (note 3 above) – before it was repealed by the Chapter 8 of the National Health Act, 
the Human Tissue Act was the only legislation governing medico-legal issues in South Africa. 
64 DJ McQuoid-Mason Medical Professions and Practice LAWSA 17 (2) 2 ed (2008) 63. 
65 The Human Tissue Act (note 3 above). 
66 The National Health Act (note 4 above) Chapter 8. 
67 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
68 Ibid. 
69 The Human Tissue Act (note 3 above). 
70 Ibid Section 1. 





embryos in relation to cryopreservation, but does so in the context of research76 and human 
cloning will not form part of the discussion during this paper.77 
 
The Regulations78 refer to ownership of the embryos before and after artificial fertilisation 
(not specifically to cryopreserved embryos) as set out below: 
(a) Regulation 18 (1)79 states that before artificial fertilisation ownership of the embryo 
vests in the institution in which the IVF treatments is to be carried out.   
(b) Regulation 18 (2)80 states that after artificial fertilisation ownership of the embryo 
vests in the recipient.81 
The vesting of ownership may not cause concern when the recipient is also the female gamete 
donor.  However, concerns arise when the male donor, shares a genetic link with the embryo, 
and the recipient, does not share a genetic link to the embryo, yet she still retains ownership 
of the embryo after artificial fertilisation, by virtue of the fact that only a female can be a 
receipient.  The Regulations82 do not provide for shared or joint control of the embryo after 
fertilisation.  The Constitutionality of this may be challeged in terms of the equality clause83 
on the ground of sexual discrimination.84   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
74 The National Health Act (note 4 above). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid Section 57. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
79 Ibid Regulation 18 (1). 
80 Ibid Regulation 18 (2). 
81 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above) - define a recipient as ‘a female 
person in whose reproductive organs a male gamete or gametes are to be introduced by other than natural 
means; or in whose uterus/womb or fallopian tubes a zygote or embryo is to be placed for the purpose of human 
reproduction’ - Regulation 1. 
82 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
83 1996 Constitution (note 2 above) Section 9 (3). 




It is submitted that the argument raised, by the father who shares a genetic link with the child, 
would be that the receipient is always a female, and even if she is not genetically linked to the 
embryo, she still holds complete rights over the embryo after fertilisation.  The father would 
argue that the recipient has more control over his child, simply because as a woman she is 
genetically designed to carry the child.  
 
For the purpose of this discussion the focus will be on who holds rights over the 
cryopreserved embryos and their status before they are used in the IVF treatement process, 
while they are still in storage at the fertility institution.   
The Regulations85 define freezing or cryopreservation86  and is the only source of law to 
recognise and define cryopreservation. However, the Regulations87 do not provide for who 
makes the decision not to transfer the embryos nor do they make any express provisions for 
the status of cryopreserved embryos.  
 
 
2.2.3. The Common Law 
The law in South Africa makes no distinction between an embryo and a foetus.  The common 
law, in the case of Collop,88 states that there is essentially ‘no difference between an embryo 
and a foetus’.89  Therefore, it can be argued that all the rights that are afforded to the foetus, 
should be also afforded be afforded to the cryopreserved embryo. However, it is argued that 
legal personality begins at birth provided that the birth is complete and the child is born 
alive.90  Since, natural persons obtain all their rights upon birth, it seems South Africa does 
not afford any rights to cryopreserved embryos.   
 
                                                          
85 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
86 Ibid - freezing or cryopreservation means ‘freezing or cryopreserving genetic material including ova, sperm, 
embryos, ovarian tissue or stem cells by an authorised institution,’ Regulation 1. 
87 Ibid. 
88 S v Collop (note 46 above). 
89 Ibid 383. 
90 DSP Cronje & J Heaton The South African Law of Persons 2 ed (2003) 7. 
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The Christian Lawyers91 case (discussed above) is another case that supports the approach 
adopted by our Constitution92 which is that no provision is made for the recognition or legal 
status of embryos or foetuses,  unless such a foetus is born alive.93   
 
The term ownership is used in the Regulations94 to refer to embryos. In terms of the law of 
property, ownership can be defined as ‘the real right that potentially confers the most 
complete or comprehensive control over a thing, which means that the right of ownership 
entitles the owner to do with his or her things as he or she deems fit, subject to the limitations 
imposed by public and private law.’95  The use of the term ownership implies that an embryo 
is viewed merely as a thing over which a person may have complete control.  The wording of 
Regulation 1896 suggests that South Africa may view embryos as property.  Ownership of the 
embryos prior to fertilisation vests in the institution where the embryos are held, but the 





A popular South African author, Jordaan,98 states that pre-embryos (cryopreserved embryos) 
should not be afforded any legal protection by the law.  I disagree with this author’s view.  
This is not the approach this paper will take, as the discussion advocates for the recognition 
of a legal status to be conferred upon them. 
 
It is submitted that South African law is analogous with Jordaan’s99 view on cryopreserved 
embryos, as it fails to afford any legal status to them.  This is a growing concern especially 
                                                          
91 Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others (note 49 above). 
92 1996 Constitution (note 2 above). 
93 Ibid 1121. 
94 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
95 PJ Badenhorst & JM Pienaaranf & H Mostert Silberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 91. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Regulations relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (note 1 above). 
98 DW Jordaan ‘The Legal Status of the Human Pre-Embryo in the Context of the Genetic Revolution’ SALJ 




with IVF treatment becoming increasingly prevalent.  There has not yet been any South 
African precedent which deals specifically with the legal status afforded to cryopreserved 
embryos in instances of divorce proceedings.  Therefore, there is a need for the establishment 
and implementation of definitive framework in this regard. 
 
Unlike South Africa, the United States of America,100 the United Kingdom101 and 
Australia102 have made advancements regarding this area of law. These jurisdictions have 
deliberated on issues regarding the legal status of embryos and who asserts rights over them 
during custody matters when divorce proceedings have been insitituted.  Some countries have 
even set up committes103 to draft legislation to this effect. In the next chapter, these will be 












                                                          
100 Davis v Davis (1992) 842 SW 2d 588 Tenn: Supreme Court. 
101 The Warnock Committee Report (note 12 above). 
102 Re Estate of the Late K and Re the Administration and Probate Act 1935: Ex Parte the Public Trustee (1996) 
TASSC 24. 
103 The Warnock Committee (note 12 above); New South Wales Commission (note 13 above). 
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3. The Approach taken by the International Community and Foreign 
Jurisdictions regarding the status of cryopreserved embryos 
The previous chapter mentioned South African law regarding the legal status of cryopreseved 
embryos.  South Africa has not yet dealt with a case relating to the legal status of 
cryopreserved embryos, and has not drafted legislation regulating this issue.  There is a 
lacuna in South African law and this chapter will focus on the approaches taken by other 
countries to determine which country has the most appropriate approach in dealing with the 
legal status of cryopreserved embryos.  In particular the discussion will deal with which party 
these embryos should be awarded to in the instance of divorce proceedings being instituted 
between the creators of the cryopreserved embryo.  
As stated earlier, the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Australia have made advancements regarding this area of law. Each of these jurisdictions has 
decided cases regarding the legal status of embryos.  The UK and Australia have dealt with 
the issue to the extent of setting up committees104 whose recommendations have been used to 
draft legislation.  The USA does not have legislation to govern this issue, and rely strongly on 
common law.  The USA, through its common law, has used the law of contract, to recognise 
embryo disposition agreements, to regulate the status of cryopreserved embryos.  
 
In general, embryos are viewed in 3 different ways:105   
(a) personal property;  
(b) human beings; or 
(c) neither persons nor property (special category). 
 
The latter occupy a sui generis106 category and are entitled to special respect as they are 
viewed as potential human life.107 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 KE Diamond ‘Cryogenics, Frozen Embryos and the Need For New Means of Regulation: Why the U.S. is 
Frozen in its Current Approach,’ New York Int LR (1998) 11 77, 83. 
106 Sui generis means ‘of its own kind.’  It is used to describe a form of legal protection that exists outside 
typical legal protection and is something that is unique or different,’ available at: 
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/sui-generis-term.html, accessed 29th October 2014. 
107 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 168. 
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International Law will be discussed briefly before examining the views of each of the three 
jurisdictions on the legal status of cryopreserved embryos. 
 
 
3.1 The impact of international law on the cryopreserved embryo 
 
3.1.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights108 (ICCPR) together with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is commonly referred to as the international 
Bill of Rights.109  The ICCPR110 which is a treaty that sets out basic human rights, such as: 
the right to life and human dignity; equality before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association; religious freedom and privacy; freedom from torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary 
detention; gender equality; the right to a fair trial, and; minority rights111 was adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1966 and came into force in 1976.112  The ICCPR113 obliges states 
that sign it to take executive, judicial, and legislative measures to ratify it, in order to protect 
the rights as set out in this instrument.114  The first paragraph of Article 6 of the ICCPR115 
states that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life’.  It is submitted that the wording 
of this Article116 does not define ‘human being’.  It is argued by some authors that the 
protection of the right to life should be afforded not only to the born but to the unborn as 
                                                          
108 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, 999 171 available at: 
http://ww.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html, accessed 31st October 2014. 
109 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), available at: 
https://aclu.org/human-rights/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr, accessed 2nd September 2014. 
110 UN General Assembly (note 100 above.) 
111 American Civil Liberties Union (note 101 above). 
112 http://legal.un.org/avl/iccpr/iccpr.html, accessed 24th August 2014. 
113 Ibid. 
114 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, accessed 4th December 2014. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid Article 6. 
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well.117  This would mean that the protection under Article 6118 would be extended to 
embryos from the moment of conception.  When deciding to elaborate on the ICCPR,119 
some states (Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico and Morocco) proposed to re-structure 
Article 6120 to include protection of foetuses and embryos from the moment of conception.  
This view was rejected by the majority of states as there was no conclusive evidence to prove 
when conception occurs.121 
 
Another argument for why the extension of the application should not be acceptable is that 
laws regulating abortion would have been affected.  One cannot abort the embryo due to the 
fact that is covered by the right to life,122 as the mother who terminates her pregnancy would 
be charged with murder. Ultimately, Petersen123 concludes that there are no compelling legal 
arguments that are made to afford any protection to an embryo, especially protection of the 













                                                          
117 N Petersen ‘The Legal Statutes of the Human Embryo in vitro: General Human Rights Instruments’ (2005) 
65 447 ,449 available at: 
http://wwwzaoerv.de, accessed on 19th October 2014. 




122 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 83. 
123 Petersen (note 117 above) 453. 
124 Ibid 464. 
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3.2. The United States of America (USA) 
 
3.2.1. Legislation 
The advances made in medical technology have surpassed legislation.  This is why there is an 
urgent need for legislation to govern the advancements in medical technology so that the 
disputes that arise can be adequately dealt with by the judiciary.125 
 
Various states in the USA have passed legislation dealing with embryos, abortion and human 
cloning with very few states dealing specifically with the disposition of cryopreserved 
embryos on dissolution of marriage.126 
 
In 2004 California passed legislation relating to the disposition of embryos remaining in a 
fertility clinic to the effect that an advance directive needs to be effected by the parties 
regarding how these embryos  should be disposed of in the event of death or divorce by either 
one or both parties.127  The legislation128requires written informed consent from the parties if 
they want to donate the remaining embryos once they have completed their fertility 
treatment.129 
 
Colorado has passed legislation130 dealing with conception posthumously as well as after a 
divorce.  The legislation131 states that if death or divorce should take place before 
implantation of the cyropreserved embryo, then the former spouse or deceased spouse is not 
the parent of the child born from the implantation unless written consent is produced to prove 
the contrary by the former or deceased spouse.132  The statute makes no reference to the legal 
status of the embryos or how they are to be disposed of the embryos upon divorce.133  The 
legislation is defective, in that it allows for one genetic parent to bear and produce the child 
                                                          
125 JB v MB (2001) 783 A 2d 707 NJ. 
126 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 193. 
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without the consent of the other genetic parent.  This goes against the boni mores of 
society,134 as it forces a person into parenthood, which is appropriately guarded against and 
protected.135 Similar legislation has been passed in Delaware,136 but it is even narrower as it 
fails to make provision for implantation posthumously.137 
 
Florida has passed legislation138 that is similar to the legislation in California, relating to the 
disposition of embryos in the instance of either death or divorce.139  The statute fails to 
elucidate whether a contract in terms of the statute is enforceable between the parties 
themselves, or between the parties and the medical practitioner administering the IVF 
treatment.140 
 
Although Louisiana has a civil law system,141 it is the only state to enact legislation142 which 
confers legal status on and grants rights to, cryopreserved embryos in the IVF process.143  It 
is submitted that the drafters of the legislation granted this status to embryos on the basis that 
to protect the embryo is to protect human life.144  Since these embryos enjoy all the 
protection and rights afforded to human beings, they are referred to as judicial person,145 and 
                                                          
134 E Waldman ‘The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” In Frozen Embryo Disputes’ 
(2004) 53 American Univ LR 1021, 1035. 
135 AZ v BZ (2000) NE 2d Mass 725. 
136 Delaware Code Annotated Title 13. 
137 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 196. 
138 West Florida Statutes Annotated  (1997). 
139 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 196. 
140 HS Shapo ‘Frozen Preembryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind,’ Duke J of Comparative and Int Law 
(2002) 12 75, 83.  
141 A civil law system refers to ‘the body of laws laws governing disputes between individuals, as opposed to 
those governing offenses that are public and relate to the government.  The Civil law system differs from that 
common law system because; it allows appellate courts to hear matters on appeal and review that not only deal 
with a point of law, but also a point of fact,’ available at: 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/civil+law, accessed 28th November 2014. 
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143 Ibid Sections 9:121 - 9:129. 
144 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 196. 
145 In terms of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated, ‘judicial persons’ are defined as ‘of or relating to 
judicial proceedings or to the administration of the law.’ 
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are not the property of the IVF clinic, the ‘parents’ or the doctor who administers the IVF 
treatment.146 
 
It is submitted that there are many states that have enacted legislation dealing with the 
disposition of cryopreserved embryos, the wording of the statutes make reference to research 
and other aspects regarding cryopreserved embryos and are not clear enough for the courts to 
apply them without difficulty.147  It is submitted the legislation in California and Louisiana 
are very useful, but since the USA is a federal state, the legislation only applies to the state 
that enacted them. 
 
 
3.2.2. The Common Law 
There are mainly two approaches that courts use when presented with disputes relating to the 
custody of cryopreserved embryos in the instance of divorce:148 
(a) The Contractual Approach;149 and 
(b) The Balancing Approach.150 
 
The cases discussed below will illustrate how these approaches are applied by the courts. 
The most important case that has been dealt with in relation to the disposition of 
cryopreserved embryos in divorce proceedings is the case of Davis v Davis.151  It is the first 
                                                          
146 Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated 9:126. 
147 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 198. 
148 Szarfranski v Dunston (2013) 933 NE 2d 502, 506. 
149 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 198 – under this approach, where there is an existence of a contract 
(agreement) entered into by the parties regarding the disposition of cryopreserved embryos, the courts will 
enforce the provided that such a contract is clear, unambiguous and not contra bonos mores. 
150 Szarfranski v Dunston (note 148 above) – under this approach the courts will balance the interests of the 
parties. This approach is used when there is an absence of a contract (agreement) between the parties regarding 
the disposition of the cryopreserved embryos in the instance of divorce.  The balancing approach is also used 
where there is an agreement but the agreement is unclear or ambiguous; or where the agreement is contra bonos 
mores and cannot be enforced by the courts. 
151 Davis v Davis (note 100 above). 
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American case to have dealt with the issue and was heard by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court.152 
Mr and Mrs Davis were married and expecting their first child when, unfortunately, Mrs 
Davis suffered an extremely painful tubal pregnancy,153 as a result of which she had surgery 
to remove her right fallopian tube.154  During the course of the marriage, Mrs Davis suffered 
four more tubal pregnancies.  After the fifth tubal pregnancy, Mrs Davis chose to have her 
left fallopian tube ligated.  This procedure left Mrs Davis without being able to conceive 
naturally.155  Mr and Mrs Davis decided to try IVF treatment after failed attempts at adoption.  
The rigorous and regular harvesting process caused extreme discomfort to Mrs Davis with no 
results.  The institution recommended to Mr and Mrs Davis the option of cryogenically 
freezing the embryos for implantation at a later stage, which they accepted.  The Davis’ had 
undergone six attempts at IVF treatment but the pregnancy they had hoped for never 
materialised.  This caused a huge strain on their marriage financially and emotionally156 and 
Mr Davis filed for divorce.157  The couple agreed on all the terms of the dissolution of the 
marriage, except which one of them would get custody of the seven embryos that were still 
being kept in storage at the clinic.158  The trial court awarded custody to Mrs Davis159 and 
ordered that she was to be given the opportunity to implant these embryos and become a 
parent. 
The appeal court reverse this decision and stated that Mr Davis had a ‘constitutionally 
protected right not to produce a child where no pregnancy has taken place’ and stated that 
‘there is no compelling state interest to justify making the order to implant the embryo 
                                                          
152 Ibid 589. 
153 A tubal pregnancy is a condition where the fertilised egg attaches itself and grows in an area other than the, 
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against the wishes of either party.’160  Essentially, it is the parent who wishes not to become a 
parent whose interests outweigh those of the other parent. 
 
There are two factors that guided the court to coming to its decision:161 
(a) The existence of a written agreement, between the clinic where the embryos were being 
held in storage and Mr and Mrs Davis, stating how the embryos are to be with disposed of 
in the instance of a divorce; and 
(b) That there was no statute or case law to rely on or refer to as a precedent since this was 
the first case to deal with this particular issue.162 
 
Mrs Davis wished to obtain custody of the embryos as she wished to implant them and 
become a parent.163  Some of the arguments raised were that since Mr and Mrs Davis created 
the embryos, they had made an ‘irrevocable commitment to reproduction’164 and intended to 
become parents.  An opposing argument was that Mr Davis requested for the cryopreserved 
embryos to be kept in storage at the facility until he decided whether or not he wanted to 
become a parent outside the bounds of marriage.165 
The appeal court concluded that the interests of both parties had to be weighed in order to 
come to a decision that was fair and reasonable.166 
 
In deciding who to award custody of the cryopreserved embryos to, the court had to consider 
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161 Ibid 590. 
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The issue dealt with two completely opposing positions:168 
(a) The position, which was adopted by the trial court, was to consider that after fertilisation, 
the cryopreserved embryo should acquire the rights that are afforded to a person.  
(b) The other position was that the cryopreserved embryos are nothing more than property 
and have the same status as any other human tissue, and therefore are, not deserving of 
the right or legal status of a person.   
The appeal court considered these two positions and then introduced a third, intermediate 
position which holds that the cryopreserved embryo deserves respect greater than that 
accorded to human tissue, but not the respect accorded to actual persons.169 The court 
concluded that it deserved special respect as it is a potential human life.170 
Cases of this nature are very intricate and cannot be decided by the courts using a general 
formula. Each case should be judged on their surrounding facts and circumstances.  Embryo 
disposition agreements can be used to settle these disputes.171  In making this submission, 
there should be clear, unambiguous and definitive legislation that governs the contents of 
these embryo disposition agreements.172 
 
This is the first, but not the only case that has dealt with this issue before.  The USA is the 
only country to have dealt with so many cases involving cryogenically frozen embryos and 
their disposition in the instance of divorce.173 
 
There are more cases that have dealt with embryo disposition agreements.  In some of these 
cases the embryo disposition agreements have been enforced against the wish of one or both 
parties, and in other cases the agreement has not been given effect to, despite compelling 
arguments raised by one or both parties stating why the agreement should be enforced.174  
                                                          
168 Langley & Blackston (note 23 above) 178. 
169 Davis v Davis (note 100 above) 597. 
170 Vinciguerra (note 162 above) 413. 
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The reason is due to vagueness and ambiguity in the contract or because the enforcement of 
the agreement would amount to a violation of public policy.175   
 
In such instances, the court will decide these cases by applying the balancing approach 
(discussed above):176  
(a) Where there is an absence of an embryo disposition agreement 
(b) Where there is evidence of ambiguity in the contract; or 
(c) Where enforcement would be contra bonos mores. 
 
The cases discussed deal with the application of this approach. 
In the case of Kass v Kass,177 the couple had been trying to conceive a child naturally but 
were unsuccessful.  They then opted for IVF treatment.  The institution required Mr and Mrs 
Kass to sign an embryo disposition agreement setting out how to dispose the embryos.  The 
couple signed an agreement, dealing with the disposition of the embryos178 in a property 
settlement agreement.179  The IVF procedure was unsuccessful and within three weeks of 
signing the forms at the IVF institution, the couple instituted divorce proceedings.  The 
divorce papers made provision for disposition of the embryos if Mr and Mrs Kass did not 
want to continue with the IVF treatment.  The agreement stated that the embryos would be 
donated to research and that neither party would lay individual claims against them.180  
However, Mrs Kass later changed her mind and decided to keep the embryos to implant them 
in the future181 as she was one of the genetic parents and it was her only opportunity to 
become a mother.  Mr Kass objected to this, as refused to be forced into parenthood, and did 
not want to father a child with Mrs Kass after their divorce.182   
The trial court did not accept the embryo disposition agreement and awarded the embryos to 
Mrs Kass, against the arguments raised by Mr Kass.183   
                                                          
175 SB Apel ‘Cryopreserved Embryos: A Response to “Forced Parenthood” and the Role of Intent’ Family LQ 
(2005) 39(3) 663, 665. 
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The Appeal Court,184 however, overturned the decision of the trial court, stating that where 
there is a contract that has been signed, it must be presumed that that contract is valid and 
must be given effect to.185 The court granted an order in favour of Mr Kass, giving effect to 
the agreement.186 
 
In the case of AZ v BZ187 the couple had, after many failed attempts at natural conception, 
decided to enrol for IVF treatment.  The facility that they had chosen made them sign an 
agreement regarding the disposition of embryos in the event of divorce.188  The agreement 
stated that no implantation of embryos would take place unless the consent of both parties 
was obtained.189  The agreement was signed by the husband and later signed by the wife, 
after adding a term to the agreement stating that the embryos would be given to the wife for 
implantation190 if the marriage dissolved.191  The wife became pregnant and the couple had 
twin daughters192 as a result of the IVF treatment the wife then decided to have embryos 
implanted without obtaining the consent of her husband.193  The couple decided to get 
divorced and during these proceedings, the husband sought an interdict preventing his wife 
from implanting any more embryos, whereas the wife sought to enforce the agreement which 
stated that she was entitled to the embryos for future implantation upon divorce.194   
Both the trial and appeal courts disregarded the contract, stating that the wording of the 
contract was ambiguous, with the appeal court stating that there was no binding agreement 
and resolved the matter by balancing the interests of the parties.195  It is against the boni 
mores of society to force a party to become a parent against their will.196 
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In the case of Roman v Roman197 the couple were married but had trouble conceiving a child 
naturally.198  They sought the advice of a specialised doctor199 who recommended that they 
try IVF treatment.200  The facility where the IVF treatment would take place required the 
couple to enter into an agreement regarding the disposition of the embryos if the IVF 
treatment was terminated.201  The couple entered into an embryo disposition agreement with 
the institution which stated that the embryos would be discarded in the instance of divorce.202  
Unfortunately the couple was unsuccessful at the IVF procedure and the husband filed for 
divorce.203  The husband requested the trial court to uphold the agreement and discard the 
embryos.  The court, instead awarded the embryos to the wife so that she had the opportunity 
to implant the embryos and have her own biological child.204  The appeal court agreed with 
the husband, and stated that the trial court had violated the embryo disposition agreement 
between the parties205 and reversed the decision of the trial court.206  
 
The reasons provided by the court were that:207 
(a) The agreement was clear and unambiguous, therefore, was valid and enforceable; and 
(b) At the time of signing the agreement, both parties were aware of the consequences of 
the agreement; 
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In the previous cases it was always the woman advocating for the embryos to be given to her 
so that she could have them implanted at a later date208 and essentially, forcing the man into 
parenthood.209   
 
The case of J.B v M.B210 is different from the earlier cases, because in this case, the husband 
wished to become a parent, while the wife did not.  After marriage, the couple realised that 
the wife had a condition that prevented her from conceiving naturally and decided to try IVF 
treatment.211  The fertility clinic required the couple to sign an embryo disposition agreement 
which stated that upon the dissolution of their marriage, the embryos would be released to the 
IVF programme at the institution.212  The procedure was successful and a year later, the wife 
gave birth to a child.  During the same year the couple decided to get divorced.  The wife 
expressed her wish to abandon the embryos, while the husband wanted to donate the embryos 
to an infertile couple.213 
The trial court concluded that the interest of the wife in not wanting to become a parent 
outweighed the interest of the husband who wanted to donate the embryos.214   
The appeal court concluded that there was no valid contract and decided the matter by 
balancing the interests of the parties.  The husband contended that his right to procreate had 
been infringed because his wife wished to have the embryos discarded.  The appeal court 
stated that his right to procreate had not been infringed.  This was because the husband was 
not infertile, so the fact that his wife wanted to destroy the embryos did not mean that he 
would never be a father.215  The appeal court, reiterated the reason for rejecting the contract, 
by stating that they would not force someone into parenthood, and it is the party not wanting 
to become a parent, is the party whose interests will prevail.216 
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None of the cases discussed conclude that cryopreserved embryos deserve the same respect 
as human beings.  The approach that is adopted by the courts is the ‘special respect’ 
doctrine,217 which means that cryopreserved embryos are ‘potential human beings’ and as 
such occupy a special category in law that is worthy of protection. 
The courts do not have legal jurisprudence to rely on when hearing cases that involve custody 
disputes over cryopreserved embryos during divorces,218 but the courts have clarified that 
where an embryo disposition agreement exists, it must be enforced.  The exception to the 
enforcement of the embryo disposition agreements is when such an agreement appears to be 
unambiguous and vague.219  The courts have also stated that in the absence of such an 
agreement the interests of the parties must be balanced.220 
 
The next jurisdiction that will be discussed is the United Kingdom whose approach on the 
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3.3. The United Kingdom (UK) 
3.3.1. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Warnock Committee) of 1985 
 
In July 1982,221 a 16 member Warnock Committee222 was established under the 
Chairmanship of Mary Warnock.223224  The Warnock Committee225 was mandated with the 
task of making recommendations on the social, ethical and legal implications226 of recent 
embryology and research and development regarding infertility treatment227 as well as other 
potential developments in the field.228  These recommendations229 formed the framework for 
legislation and regulations that would govern the laws of infertility and embryology.230 
 
The Warnock Committee231 submitted a report on the current law in the country and stated 
that there was no conclusive legal status conferred upon cryopreserved embryos, the law does 
not grant the embryo the ‘same status as a child or an adult, and the law does not treat the 
human embryo as having a right to life’.232 
The Warnock Committee stated in their report233 that no live human embryo created during 
IVF, ‘whether frozen or unfrozen, may be kept alive, if not transferred to a woman, after 
fourteen days from the date of fertilisation, nor may they be used as a research subject within 
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the fourteen day time period’.234  The reason the Warnock Committee235 presented was that 
before fourteen days there would be no individual development that would have occurred.236 
‘This fourteen day period does not include any time during which the embryo may have been 
frozen’.237 Even though the issue of granting extra protection to cryopreserved embryos 
(created through IVF) before the implantation was considered, the position in law is still 
unclear.238 
The Warnock Committee239 concluded their report by stating that they adopted the ‘actual 
mode of existence’ theory, which granted embryos a status analogous with property.240 
 
The Warnock Committee241 agreed that they would draft legislation based on a utilitarian 





Acting upon the Recommendations of the Warnock Committee,243 the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (the British Act)244 was passed.  The British Act245 defines and 
regulates legal aspects resulting from artificial fertilisation including the storage and use of 
gametes and embryos, embryo testing and sex selection, parenthood, surrogacy and 
consent.246 The British Act,247 further, establishes the Human Authorisation and Embryology 
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Authority (HAE Authority)248 whose function, inter alia,249 is to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the British Act.250  The British Act251 only describes embryos in the context 
within which embryos are used but does not define or confer a status upon them.252 
 
The British Act253 does not provide for ownership of the embryo but provides that, when 
conducting IVF procedures, the consent of both gamete donors254 is necessary for the 
creation of embryos, the use of embryos in treatment, and the storage of embryos.255 
 
The British Act256 fails to clearly define embryos and grant them a status in terms of the law.  
It is obvious that in the debate about whether embryos should be granted the status of 
personhood, or be regarded purely as property when determining to which party custody 
should be granted in the instance of divorce.257  The UK has clearly regarded cryopreserved 
embryos purely as property.  This is contrary to the approach set out in the American case of 
Davis,258 where cryopreserved embryos were granted the status of ‘pseudo-humans’ as they 
occupy an intermediately phase between personhood and property.  
It is submitted that the approach taken in the Davis259 case is the most appropriate approach 
to have regarding cryopreserved embryos.260   
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This view was further emphasised when the HAE Authority Chairperson,261 stated that 
embryos ‘are not “little babies” in the freezer.’262 
 
 
3.3.3. The Common Law 
In the case of Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd,263 Ms Evans discovered that she had ovarian 
cancer and, before she began her treatment for the cancer, she was offered the chance to 
remove her ovaries for the purpose of IVF treatment before the cancer affected them. She 
agreed to this.  Embryos were created using her ovaries and the sperm of her fiancé, Mr 
Johnson.  Unfortunately, the relationship ended before any of the embryos were implanted 
into Ms Evans.  Mr Johnson wanted the embryos to be destroyed since he no longer wished to 
have a child with Ms Evans.  Ms Evans, however, did not want this and applied to court for 
an order allowing her to have the embryos implanted.  The court, in rejecting her application, 
stated that it was a violation of the requirements for consent in terms of the British Act264 
(consent of both gamete donors are required for the implantation of the embryo). The case 
was dismissed.265 
 
It is submitted that in the Evans266 case, the decision of the court was beneficial to Mr 
Johnson as it enforced his rights in terms of the British Act267 and did not force him to 
become a parent, contrary to the wishes of Ms Evans.  This is an example of good advocacy, 
interpretation and application of the British Act268.   
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The next case will depict the flaws in the British Act269 and its application and interpretation 
by the courts.  Even though the next case does not deal with the status of the embryos in 
relation to divorce, it will nevertheless be discussed as an illustration of the possible 
consequences of the British Act270 which may arise when dealing with custody issues during 
divorce. 
 
In the matter of Ex Parte Blood,271 Mr Blood had been in a coma when, (upon Mrs Blood’s 
instructions), two sperm samples were taken from him by means of electro-ejaculation 
without his prior consent or knowledge.272  Mr Blood then died and Mrs Blood then wished 
to have the cryopreserved sperm transported to Belgium so that she could have the sperm 
inseminated.  There were many difficulties experienced in resolving this case as there were 
no precedents to follow and the only thing the court could rely on was the British Act,273 
which was in conflict with the European Community Treaty.274275  Instead of deliberating on 
the matter, the court referred the case to the HAE Authority for to authorise the exportation of 
the sperm.276  
The appeal court stated that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the function of the HAE 
Authority by assuming that the HAE Authority had discretion to make restrictions regarding 
the exportation of the sperm to Belgium.277  The appeal court stated that such restrictions 
should be justified based on ‘public interest’,278 and were unsatisfied with evidence of public 
interest being served (in restricting Mrs Blood from exporting the sperm to Belgium).279  The 
appeal court referred the matter back to the HAE Authority to be reviewed.280  After review, 
                                                          
269 The British Act (note 244 above). 
270 Ibid. 
271 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Ex Parte Blood (1997) 2 All ER 687. 
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the HAE Authority withdrew its objection to Mrs Blood’s application to export the sperm of 
the late Mr Blood.281 
 
The judiciary cannot be blamed for this error, because it is the consequence of poorly drafted 
legislation.282 
 
The legislation drafted by the UK, based on the recommendations of the Warnock 
Committee,283 may not have been very effective regarding its content, but the entire process, 
concluding with the enactment of the British Act,284 was highly commendable.  
 
In the case of Evans285 the court decided in favour of the party not wanting to become a 
parent.  This court, unlike in Ex Parte Blood286 case, correctly interpreted the provisions of 
the British Act.287 
 
As previously mentioned, the USA and UK have completely different views on how 
cryopreserved embryos should be treated and what status or rights they deserve.288  The UK 
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Unlike the differences between the UK and the USA, the UK and Australia share similar 
views in their approach regarding the legal status of cryopreserved embryos.  The discussion 
here will focus on the similarities between the UK and Australia.  Australia, like the UK, is 
more conservative in dealing with the development of law and social considerations in 
relation to ethical and legal issues surrounding cryopreserved embryos.291  Australia has 
largely followed the UK in its reasoning and approach on how to deal with cryopreserved 
embryos.   Like the UK, Australia also called for the establishment of an inquiry committee, 
whose recommendations they would use to draft legislation.292   
 
 
3.4.1. New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report 58 of 1988 - Artificial 
Conception: In Vitro Fertilisation 
The New South Wales Commission293 which was established in 1988, parallel to the 
Warnock Committee294 in their objectives, substance, and recommendations was set up 
because, like the UK, Australia had no conclusive guidelines or legislation to follow when 
dealing with issues regarding cryopreserved embryos.295 
 
The recommendations made by the New South Wales Commission296 state that ‘embryos 
may only be stored for 10 years after which they may not be kept alive’.297  The 
Recommendations also state that where either partner298 dies, the ‘surviving partner retains 
the power of use, dealing and disposition’.299  In the event that both partners die, ‘such power 
vests in the fertility clinic or storage facility’.300 
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Recommendation 2301 states that ‘no embryo should be allowed to develop in vitro, beyond 
the point at which implantation would normally occur and should therefore not be kept alive 
longer than 14 days,302 (excluding any period in storage) and cannot be disposed of unless the 
couple for whom the ovum was fertilised agree to the disposition’.303 
 
Analogous to the Warnock Committee304 in the UK, the Recommendations made by the New 
South Wales Commission305 formed the basis for enacted legislation and regulations that 
govern cryopreserved embryos in Australia. 
 
3.4.2. Legislation 
In 1995 the Infertility Treatment Act306 was passed, based predominantly on the 
recommendations made by the New South Wales Commission.307 
The Infertility Treatment Act308 fails to define cryopreservation or cryopreserved embryos.  
The Infertility Treatment Act309 also fails to include embryo in its definitions,310 but defines 
gametes.311  Section 9312 sets out the requirements for consent,313 as well as for the 
withdrawal of consent.314 
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The Infertility Treatment Act315 is very similar to the British Act.316  Both the Acts317 have 
the same time period for when an embryo should be kept ‘alive’ before they are discarded, 
and they both have internal regulatory bodies to ensure the smooth running of the Act.318 
 
 
3.4.3. The Common Law 
There have not been any cases that have dealt particularly with the issue of cryogenically 
frozen embryos in relation to custody during divorce; however, there is one case that dealt 
with embryos and inheritance rights.319 
 
The Supreme Court of Tasmania in the case of Estate of the Late K320 decided that there was 
an urgent need for a precedent to be set that the court could follow when considering the 
issue of cryopreserved embryos.  The court applied the Recommendations made by New 
South Wales Commission321 and concluded that since the child was born of a cryopreserved 
embryo, (a product of his father’s semen and mother’s ovum), which was implanted in the 
mother’s womb after the death of his father, he should not be denied the right to claim an 
inherence from his father’s estate in terms of the law.322 
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These recommendations by the New South Wales Commission323 and subsequent enacted 
legislation, the Infertility Treatment Act,324 are very similar to the Warnock Committee’s 
Recommendations325  and the British Act.326   
Since Australia has adopted the approach taken by the United Kingdom, as is evident from 
the wording of the Recommendations made by the New South Wales Commission,327 
Australia has also considered embryos to be property and failed to granted them legal status 
or afford them any significant protection in terms of the law.   
 
The enacted legislation328 does not contribute anything to the current discussion.  The 
Infertility Treatment Act329 fails to define embryos, and offers no significance to the 




Legislators in all of the jurisdictions we have discussed have failed to confer legal status on 
cryopreserved embryos.  The state of California made the most significant advancement on 
how embryos should be dealt upon the dissolution of marriage, but that the USA, (unlike the 
UK and South Africa which are unitary states) is a federal state and laws that bind California 
will not be binding on any other state in the US, rendering this piece of legislation futile, 
unless other states enact similar legislation. 
It is clear from the discussion of American case law, that the common law in the USA is far 
more developed than statutory law.  The USA adequately deals with situations involving 
custody of cryopreserved embryos in divorces by applying its well-developed common law.   
 
It is submitted that in terms of the approach applied by the courts by the three jurisdictions 
discussed in this chapter, the USA has the most appropriate approach, in suggesting the use 
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of embryo disposition agreements, which are regulated by the common law, firmly based on 
the law of contract.330 
 
The discussion in the next chapter will focus on surrogacy agreements in South Africa, the 
requirements for establishing the agreement, the effectiveness of the agreement, the 
prohibitions relating to the agreements and how the agreements can be compared to embryo 
disposition agreements.331  The chapter will also deal with a discussion on the absence of an 
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4. Surrogacy Agreements and their similarity to Embryo Disposition 
Agreements 
In the previous chapter we looked at cases and legislation in the international perspective as 
well as the US, the UK, and Australia, and examined the cases and legislation that regulate 
cryopreserved embryos in those jurisdictions.  Many of the American cases333 and the case of 
Evans334 in the UK considered and referred to embryo disposition agreements335 and their 
need to be enforced.336   
 
In this chapter we will consider surrogacy agreements337 and their relationship with embryo 
disposition agreements as well as the issue of, whether these embryo disposition agreements 
are contra bonos mores.   
 
The relevance of this discussion is to illustrate an alternative solution to the problem that 
South Africa is currently faced with.  The problem is the failure of the South African 
government to create legislation that affords legal status or protection to cryopreserved 
embryos.  The alterative being that, since the Children’s Act338 governs surrogacy 
agreements, a comparison will be drawn between surrogacy agreements and embryo 
disposition agreements, in order to portray their similarities.  We will also discuss the 
position of surrogacy agreements in other jurisdictions, for the purposes of comparison to the 
South African model.  Finally, we will look at the concept of embryo disposition agreements 
and their effect on forced parenthood.339 
 
 
As mentioned above, the acceptance of embryo disposition agreements in South Africa needs 
to be discussed.  However, since the comparison is being made between embryo disposition 
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agreements and surrogacy agreements, it must be first established whether or not surrogacy 
agreements are conta bonos mores. 
 
4.1. Surrogacy Agreements 
The relationship of surrogacy and the terms and conditions thereof are all based on a 
compulsory surrogacy agreement,340 (which ‘reduces the risk of a breach of the surrogate 
motherhood arrangement and consequent litigation’).341  Surrogacy involves the surrogate 
mother342 who carries the child and the commissioning person/parents, one or both of whom 
share a genetic link to the child.   
The process involves the surrogate mother carrying the child who, upon birth, will be handed 
over to the commissioning person/parents to be raised as their own child.343  In terms of the 
law in South Africa, surrogacy agreements are governed by the Childrens Act344 and are 
defined in terms of Section 1 of the Children’s Act.345  Prior to the commencement of the 
Childrens Act,346 surrogacy agreements were regulated by the common law. 
 
Internationally, the Australian approach, which states that surrogacy should be, altogther, 
discouraged both legally and morally347 is different from the approach taken in the UK and 
the USA348 which encourage and regulate surrogacy.349 
                                                          
340 The Children’s Act (note 14 above) Section 293 – the surrogacy agreement must be entered into, in writing, 
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4.1.1. Surrogacy Agreements in terms of the Common Law 
Although surrogacy was never explicitly prohibited, the common law approach to surrogacy 
was to assess whether the issues arising out of surrogacy agreements were contra bonos 
mores.350 
 
South Africa’s common law has recognised the establishment of surrogacy and considers it to 
be a legal procedure.351  In terms of the common law, surrogacy agreements are established 
in terms of written contracts which are regulated by basic contractual principles and 
requirements such as the ‘rights and duties of the parties, enforceability, breach and remedies 
for such breach’.352 These agreements are only ‘valid and enforceable if they are not 
considered  to be contra bonos mores’.  It does not simply mean that because the 
requirements and principles of the law of contract have been satisfied, an agreement is not 
contra bonos mores, as the content of the contract may be contra bonos mores.353 
What needs to be determined is how the law can prevent these contracts from being contra 
bonos mores and afford protection to the parties in terms of the common law.  What happens 
if the surrogate mother decides to change her mind at the last minute and not hand over the 
baby to the commissioning parents even if they are both genetically related to the baby?354   
 
The only available case to illustrate the position of the common law is the case of Conradie v 
Rossouw.355  This case dealt with a breach of contract regarding an option to purchase a 
farm.356  The court stated that where two or more people possessing capacity and consensus 
to enter into a valid agreement in terms of the law, a valid and enforceable contract arises 
between the parties.357  If one of the parties commits a breach, the other party will have 
remedies for breach in terms of the law of contract available to them.358   
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However, where the surrogate mother refuses to hand over the child, an award for damages 
would not suffice as there can be no monetary value placed on a child, and the consequential 
loss of the commissioning parents.359 
 
It is clear that one cannot force a woman to become pregnant, as doing this would be contra 
bonos mores.  It is submitted that altruistic surrogacy was allowed but commercial surrogacy 




4.1.2. Surrogacy Agreements as regulated by Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 98 of 
2005 
Previously, surrogacy agreements were regulated in terms of the common law, which was the 
subject of many controversies and inconsistencies.  Now, surrogacy agreements361 are 
regulated in terms of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.362 
Chapter 19363 regulates everything that deals with surrogacy agreements, which includes but 
is not limited to surrogate motherhood agreements,364 ‘confirmation by the court’,365 
‘artificial fertilisation of a surrogate mother’366 and conduct that is prohibited in relation to 
these agreements. 
 
In terms of section 292,367 the agreement: 
(a) ‘must be in writing;  
(b) signed by all the parties;  
(c) entered into within the Republic of South Africa (RSA);  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
358 Ibid 324. 
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(d) at least one of the commissioning parents are domiciled in the RSA;  
(e) the surrogate mother must be domiciled in the RSA at the time when the agreement is 
entered into; and 
(f) the agreement must be confirmed by the High Court in a jurisdiction where the 
commissioning person or parents are domiciled, in order for the agreement to be valid; 
effective and enforceable’. 
 
Section 295368 deals with the confirmation of these agreements by the High Court.  However, 
in order for the court to confirm the surrogacy agreement, the court must be satisfied that 
parties have the requisite capacity.  This confirmation must take place before the surrogate 
mother is artificially fertilised.  The artificial fertilisation ‘must be before the lapse of 
eighteen months from the date of the confirmation of the agreement by the Court’.369  The 
agreement,370 in addition to all the requirements referred to in the Children’s Act,371 must 
also make provision for conditions that will affect the child’s general care and well-being.  
The agreement must provide for situations where one of the parties dies before the birth of 
the child.  The agreement should also deal with custody of the child, if the commissioning 
parents get divorced before the birth of the child.372 
An important matter that the Children’s Act373 does not provide for is that the child is the 
child of the commissioning parents from the instance of birth  and must be handed over by 
the surrogate mother to the commissioning parents as soon as reasonably possible.374 
 
The Children’s Act375 is a very structured and comprehensive piece of legislation.  It covers 
all possible areas governing children.  This includes their relations with other countries.376  
The Children’s Act377 sets out exactly what is required by law regarding surrogacy 
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agreements, in clear and unambiguous language.  The Children’s Act378 also sets out what 
conduct is prohibited.  In the event of a dispute regarding surrogacy agreements, it is 
submitted that the courts will not have difficulty in solving the matter, as long as the 
agreement has satisfied all the requirements set out in the Children’s Act.379 
Similar to the common law, the Children’s Act380 also prohibits commercial surrogacy 
agreements.381 This position is also adopted by the Australia.382 while some states in the USA 
have legalised commercial surrogacy.383  Australia, however, does not have a list of 
requirements384 that need to be fulfilled like those set out in the Children’s Act.385 
After discussing the requirements for a valid surrogacy agreement, the discussion will now 
shift to embryo disposition agreements to illustrate their similarity to surrogacy agreements. 
 
 
4.2. Embryo Disposition Agreements 
It is stated that in the absence of embryo disposition agreements, the interests of the parties 
should be balanced to determine which parties’ interest is more worthy of protection.386   
Essentially, the rights and interest in competition with each other are ‘the right to procreate 
versus the right not to procreate’.387  The purpose of the embryo disposition agreements are to 
avoid conflict388 as once a party enters into a legitimate contract, such a contract should be 
valid and enforceable.389  Sometimes weighing the interests of the party may create the 
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opportunity for error, but where there is a contractual agreement in place, the parties must be 
bound by it where the agreement is unambiguous.390 Embryo disposition agreements are 
extremely popular in the USA, since there are may cases (discussed in detail above) that 
suggest the use of these agreements. 
There are various cases that have dealt with the issue of embryo dispositon agreements.  
These essence of these cases have all been discussed in the preceding chapter. 
In this chapter the discussion will focus on the reasoning of the courts when deciding whether 
or not the embryo disposition agreement should be enforceable or not. 
In the JB v MB391 case, the court found that the agreement entered into between the couple392 
was ambiguous and unenforceable based purely on the wording,393 as the wording suggested 
that the the embryos, in the event of divorce, will be surrendered to the IVF programme at the 
clinic unless the court makes an order to the contrary.394  The court found that even if there 
was a valid agreement in place, the parties were allowed to change their minds regarding 
‘disposition of the embryos until the time of disposition’. 
 
It is submitted that the court’s decision in this case is correct even though it undermines the 
basic principles and enforceability of the law of contract.395  In the context of South Africa, it 
goes against the principles of pacta sunt servanda.396  It is acceptable to defy the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda if a contract is vague or ambiguous. 
The appeal court in the American case of Kass v Kass397 confirmed an earlier statement that 
where the agreement is found to be binding, enforceable and unambiguous in its wording, 
such an agreement must be enforced irrespective of the interests of the parties at the time of 
the dispute.  This ruling is in support of one of the requirements for a valid contract, which is 
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intention of the parties to the contract.  The intention that courts need to focus on is ‘not the 
intention of the parties at the time of the dispute but the intention of the parties at the time of 
completion of the contract’.398 
 
The American case of Davis v Davis399 emphasised the need for embryo disposition 
agreements to be entered into before commencing IVF treatment, instead of leaving the 
matter to the courts to balance the rights of the individuals.  This is of particular interest as 
there was no embryo disposition agreement in the Davis case.400  
 
In the American case of Roman v Roman401 the appeal court overturned the decision of the 
trial court stating that the agreement was valid and enforceable between the parties and that 
there was no reason why the agreement should not have been enforced.402 
 
The courts in the USA rely on the principles of the law of contract, instead of the law of 
property to deal with the concerning with the custody of cryopreserved embryos during 
divorce.403 
The salient point that needs to be made is that these agreements are legally binding and are 




4.3. Forced Parenthood 
Usually, people who conceive a child naturally405 are considered to be the parents of such a 
child.  However, assisted reproductive technology (ART) now creates more complexities in 
the simple phenomenon of parenthood.406  As explained earlier, many couples go through 
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IVF treatment in order to bear a child.407  Of these couples, some elect to cryogenically freeze 
the embryos that will be implanted into the woman at a later stage, in storage facilities at IVF 
treatment centres.408  In certain instances, the relationship between the couple disintegrates 
and they decide to get divorced.  The decision of who the embryos should be awarded to 
during divorce lies with the court.  Forced parenthood then arises, in terms of which one of 
the parties’ wishes to have the embryos given to them, either to implant at a later stage409 and 
become a parent or donate these embryos to an infertile couple, against the wishes of the 
party not wanting to become a parent.410 There are very few cases that have dealt with this 
issue, mainly because there is no legislation that governs the legal status of cryopreserved 
embryos.411  What usually occurs, in the absence of an embryo disposition agreement, is that 
the court is tasked with weighing the interests of the parties and making an order in favour of 
the party electing not to become a parent.412  Case law in support of this point are A.Z v 
B.Z413 and Davis v Davis.414 
In the American case of A.Z v B.Z415 the trial and appeal courts stated that the agreement 
which existed between the parties, due to its wording, was ambiguous and unenforceable.416  
The agreement stated that in the event of the dissolution of the marriage, the embryos would 
be awarded to the wife for future implantation.  The court held, inter alia, that the wife had 
signed the agreement after the husband had signed the document and that the husband had not 
seen the clause.417  The court, further, stated that even if the agreement had been 
unambiguous, it would still refuse to render it enforceable418 as it would be contra boni 
mores to enforce an agreement that forces someone to become a parent against their will.419 
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In the American case of JB v MB420 it was the wife who wished to have the cryopreserved 
embryos destroyed and the father who ‘wished to have them donated to an infertile 
couple’421.  The court stated that even though there was a valid agreement which dealt with 
how the cryopreserved embryos would be disposed of in the event of divorce, the court 
refused to enforce the agreement and stated that to force a party into parenthood is contra 
bonos mores.422 
 
In the UK, the case of Evans,423 although the case does not deal with forced parenthood, the 
judgment makes reference to the fact that forced parenthood is contra bonos mores. 
 
The burden of parenthood does not cease at sharing a genetic link with someone whom they 
wished not to share family ties with,424 but there are also social, financial and resource 
constraints on the party that becomes a parent against their will.425 
 
It is submitted that irrespective of the theory used, none of these courts have granted orders 
allowing ‘embryos to be awarded to a party seeking to implant them against the will of a 
party seeking to destroy the embryos or donate them to research’.426 The theme that flows 
from all the cases discussed, illustrates that irrespective of whether there is an embryo 
disposition agreement or not, the interest of the party avoiding procreation and parenthood 




4.4. Conclusion  
Surrogacy agreements have always been regulated in terms of South African law.  
Previously, surrogacy agreements were regulated under the common law, and were subject to 
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the law of contract.  Currently, surrogacy agreements are regulated in terms of Chapter 19 of 
the Children’s Act.428 
Under the common law, the only problem with surrogacy agreements was that rules regarding 
their interpretation were not precise enough and rendered too much of flexibility.  This is 
remedied under the Children’s Act.429   
This flexibility and would have allowed for commercialising of surrogacy which is prohibited 
under South African law430, neither is it allowed in Australia or the UK.431 However, in some 
states in the USA surrogacy is permitted and legal.432  
 
It is submitted that the South African position in terms of the Children’s Act433 is the most 
appropriate approach taken, when compared to Australia and the UK.  The reason for this is 
because surrogacy agreements in South Africa have requirements that need to be met before 
they are approved by the High Court,434 and if these requirements are not fulfilled, the 
agreement is not approved and the surrogacy arrangement is not permitted.  
 
There has been unanimous agreement through all of the cases that have been discussed, that 
there is a need for embryo disposition agreements,435 their need to be implemented and 
enforced.436   
 
It is evident that the basis for embryo disposition agreements is legal and is similar to 
surrogacy agreements in its content, structure and requirements.   
 
It is submitted that if the law is able to regulate surrogacy agreements through the 
promulgation of legislation, then the same consideration should be afforded to embryo 
disposition agreements.  If South Africa is not willing to draft legislation that confers legal 
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status on cryopreserved embryos to determine custody in the instance of divorce, then at least 
legislation to regulate embryo disposition agreements should be enacted. 
 
This is to prevent the judiciary from having to deal with unnecessary disputes, involving 
unambiguous or vague agreements, in which they have to weigh the interests of the parties to 
resolve the matter.  
It must also be noted that contracts of this nature are sui generis and of an intricate nature.  
They deserve special recognition, regulation and protection in our law.  Yet, as important as 
these legal requirements are, the interests of the parties must always take preference over an 
embryo disposition agreement where the wording of the agreement would force one party to 
become a parent against their wishes. 
 
It is submitted that until legislation is passed regarding the regulation of embryo disposition 
agreements, there will remain uncertainty regarding their interpretation437 and the approach 
as set out in the Davis438 case must be used, where courts balance the interests of the parties 
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
5.1. Conclusion 
Internationally and nationally, ART is becoming increasingly prominent in society, with IVF 
being the most popular form of ART.440   
The process of IVF includes cryogenically freezing some of the embryos and storing them in 
storage facilities avaliable at fertility clinics to be used for futute implantation.441 
 
Unfortunately, many marriages dissolve as a result of the strain caused by fertility treatment. 
The question of who the cryopreserved embryos are awarded to, during divorce proceedings, 
inevitably arises. 
 
The following conclusions are submitted based on the discussions in this paper: 
(a) There is South African legislation that deals with the recognition of artificial 
fertilisation,442 the procedure of artificial fertilisation, and which institutions may be used 
for such procedures.443 
 
(b) The Regulations to the National Health Act444 state that ownership of embryos vests in 
the institution where the IVF treatments will be performed.445  South African 
legislation446 then places the embryos in the care of an establishment that has no genetic 
link or interest in the embryo. 
 
The wording of Regulation 18447 suggests that South Africa views embryos as property. 
This is because ownership of the embryos, prior to fertilisation, vests in the institution in 
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which it is being held448 and as property, they should not be afforded legal status or 
protection by the law.449  However, the Regulations450  fail to make express provisions 
that catagorise embryos as property.  The Regulations451 also fail to make provisions on 
how to deal with competing interests of the parties who both wish to gain custody over 
the cryopreserved embryos to which they are genetically linked. 
 
(c) The exact nature of the embryo is still unclear, but it is clear that it is not afforded the 
same rights and protection as a person under South African law.452  
 
South Africa has not heard a case involving a dipute of custody over cryopreserved embryos 
during divorce, and yet, our law fails to afford any legal status, to cryopreserved embryos.  
This is problematic, and legislation needs to be drafted to this to remedy the deficiency.    
The reason that I have selected these particular foreign jurisdictions (USA, UK and Australia) 
to be discussed throughout this paper is that these jurisdictions have heard cases regarding the 
custody of cryopreserved embryos during divorce.  The cases discussed have contributed to 
remedying the lacuna in South African law. 
  
(d) The UK and Australia have drafted legislation to try and remedy the situation and have 
stated that there needs to be control over cryopreserved embryos.453  
The legislation drafted by the UK and Australia are futile to the debate involving the legal 
status of cryopreserved embryos upon divorce.  This is particulary true for the Infertility 
Treatment Act454 as this legislation fails to even define cryopreservation or embryos.  The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act455 fails to deal with cryopreserved embryos 
during divorce, but mentions cryopreserved embryos in relation to research. 
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(e) The courts in the USA, UK and Australia, have all heard cases dealing with which party 
is awarded custody of the cryopreserved embryos upon the dissolution of their marriage, 
unlike the courts in South Africa. The UK and Australia have even set up committees456 
to make recommendations which they have used to draft their legislation.457 
 
(f) The approach adopted by the USA has proved to be the most successful of the three 
foreign jurisdictions we have discussed throughout this paper.  Unlike the UK and 
Australia, the USA did not set up committees to specifically deal with custody of 
cryopreserved embryos during divorce.  Instead the USA has developed rules through 
their common law.  The most important of these cases being the case of Davis v Davis.458  
 
Since the USA has no legislation dealing with this issue, the principles of contract law are 
incorporated and applied through their common law.459  
The Davis460 case stated that there is a need for embryo disposition agreements to be entered 
into by a couple prior to commencement of fertility treatment.  The court also stated that in 
the absence of such an agreement, the court must balance the interests of the parties and grant 
an order in favour of the party wishing not to become a parent, as forced parenthood is contra 
bonos mores.461  Where the embryo disposition agreement is unambiguous there will be no 
need to balance the interests of the parties.462 
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(g) The approach set out in the Davis463 case is the most appropriate approach for South 
Africa to follow.  This is because prior to the Children’s Act,464 surrogacy agreements 
were regulated by the common law which relied on the law of contract for its rules.465 
(h) Embryo disposition agreements are very similar to surrogacy agreements, and deserve 





There is an urgent need for the drafting of legislation to regulate the legal status of 
cryopreserved embryos, particularly considering the prevalence of IVF treatment in the 
country. 
The following recommendations are submitted based on the discussion: 
 
(a) Since there is no legal status is afforded to cryopreserved embryos in South Africa, the 
approach taken by the UK and Australia (to set up Committees466 that made 
recommendations for legislation regarding the legal status of cryopreserved embryos) 
should be adopted in South Africa. 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission467 should be mandated with the duty of 
investigating and making recommendations468 to form the basis upon which legislation is 
drafted.469 
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(b) Alternatively, South Africa should develop the common law, similar to the USA, to assist 
the courts if they have to deal with cases regarding the custody of cryopreserved embryos 
during divorce. 
 
(c)  Lastly, since embryo disposition agreements are so similar to surrogacy agreements, and 
the requirements for surrogacy agreements have been included in the Children’s Act470, 
the legislator should amend the Children’s Act471 to include requirements (similar to the 
requirements that govern surrogacy agreements)472 to regulate embryo disposition 
agreements in South Africa. 
 
It is submitted that amending the Children’s Act473 is the easiest way to remedy the 
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